Two studies tested the prediction that group identification (importance of the group in the self-concept) moderates the impact of perceived discrimination on self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem 
Throughout the past 10 years, research on prejudice and discrimination has increasingly moved from focusing on "who is prejudiced and why" to examining how targets of prejudice cope with evidence that they and their group are devalued by society. Evidence of devaluation may come in the form of barriers to obtaining housing, education, employment, and even proper health care (Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Cash, Gillen, & Burns, 1977; Neckerman & Kirschenman, 1991; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981; Yinger, 1994) , as well as interpersonal mistreatment, such as insults, belittlement, exclusion, or exposure to racist or sexist jokes. Although there is substantial agreement among psychologists that being a target of prejudice is associated with negative psychological and physical consequences, there is less agreement about the psychological consequences of perceiving prejudice, especially with regard to personal self-esteem. Some scholars assert that perceiving that oneself or one's group is a victim of prejudice cannot help but have negative consequences for self-esteem (Allport, 1954 (Allport, /1979 Cartwright, 1950; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b) . Other scholars, in contrast, argue that the perception of prejudice against one's group does not inevitably lead to lower self-esteem and may actually protect self-relevant emotions and personal selfesteem under some circumstances (Crocker & Major, 1989) .
We report two experiments testing the hypothesis that the consequences of perceived prejudice for emotion and personal self-esteem are moderated by how strongly the individual identifies with the group that is the target of discrimination. Specifically, we predicted that perceiving prejudice against the ingroup has negative effects on the self-evaluative emotions (depression, self-esteem) of individuals who are highly identified with the ingroup but does not have negative effects on the self-evaluative emotions of people who are not highly identified with the ingroup. Indeed, for these latter individuals, perceiving prejudice against the ingroup may buffer self-evaluative emotions when the individual self is threatened.
Perceptions of Prejudice and Self-Esteem
Many scholars assume that prejudice and discrimination directed against a group will inevitably result in negative psychological consequences for individuals who are members of that group (e.g., Allport, 1954 Allport, /1979 Cartwright, 1950) . Dorwin Cartwright (1950) , for example, argued, "To a considerable extent, personal feelings of worth depend on the social evaluation of the group with which a person is identified. Self-hatred and feelings of worthlessness tend to arise from membership in underprivileged or outcast groups" (p. 440). Drawing on social identity theory, Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a) recently arrived at a similar conclusion. They argue that perceiving oneself as a victim of discrimination is harmful to the self-esteem of the stigmatized because this perception requires recognizing that an important aspect of the self-one's social identity-is devalued by powerful members of society. Furthermore, because social identity is a central component of self, threats to one's social identity (such as prejudice against one's ingroup) are experienced as threats to the self. In addition, they note that members of chronically disadvantaged groups are likely to perceive discrimination as global, stable, and pervasive, exacerbating its negative implications for selfesteem.
Consistent with the view that perceiving prejudice has negative implications for emotional well-being and selfesteem, perceiving one's group as a victim of discrimination has been shown to be negatively related to selfesteem and emotional well-being among various stigmatized groups, including women, immigrant groups, gay men, and ethnic minorities (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002 , for a review). Experimental evidence that perceiving discrimination causes lowered self-esteem and more negative self-directed emotions, however, is rare. An exception is a study in which women were asked to imagine being rejected from a course by a sexist professor (who rejected only women) or a jerk (who rejected everyone) (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a) . Rejection by a sexist professor led to more negative affect (outwardly directed hostility and self-directed depression combined) and also was seen as more internally caused ("due to something about me") than rejection by a jerk, which was seen as purely external caused.
Other research contradicts the view that perceiving prejudice against one's group will inevitably lead to lower self-esteem. For example, many groups that are targets of prejudice do not have lower self-esteem, and some groups that are chronic targets of prejudice (e.g., African Americans) have higher self-esteem than groups that are typically not targets of prejudice (Crocker & Major, 1989; Porter & Washington, 1979; Twenge & Crocker, 2002) . In an effort to explain this paradox, Crocker and Major (1989; see also Dion, 1975) ventured the hypothesis that perceiving prejudice against one's group may actually help to buffer the self-esteem of the stigmatized. In particular, they argued that individuals who are aware that they are vulnerable to being targets of prejudice might protect their self-esteem from negative outcomes by attributing those outcomes to discrimination against their group rather than to internal, stable aspects of themselves. They assumed that attributing outcomes to another's prejudice against one's group is an external attribution and that attributing negative events to external causes protects self-esteem relative to attributing negative events to internal, stable causes (such as a lack of ability) (Weiner, 1985) . It is important to point out that their hypothesis was specific to self-esteem and related self-evaluative emotions, such as depression. They did not predict, nor would one expect, that attributing outcomes to discrimination protects individuals against feeling anger or hostility (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003) .
Consistent with their self-esteem protection hypothesis, women who were evaluated negatively by a man who endorsed sexist attitudes experienced significantly less depressed affect (but not less hostility) and marginally higher self-esteem than women evaluated negatively by a man with nonsexist attitudes (Crocker et al., 1991) . In a second study, women who received negative performance feedback in the presence of blatant prejudice cues (i.e., a confederate, the presence of blatant prejudice cues, i.e., a confederate commented that she heard the evaluator was sexist) subsequently had higher self esteem than women who received the same feedback in the presence of no prejudice cues or ambiguous prejudice cues (i.e., a confederate commented that she heard the evaluator graded men and women differently) (Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003) . In another study, women who imagined being rejected from a course by a sexist professor reported significantly less depressed affect (but not less hostile affect) than women who imagined being rejected from a course because of a stable aspect of self (lack of intelligence) . Collectively, these studies indicate that the presence of group-based prejudice as a possible cause of a negative, self-relevant event can protect an individual against experiencing self-evaluative emotions such as depression and lowered self-esteem.
In sum, two differing perspectives have emerged regarding the consequences of perceiving prejudice against one's group for self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem). One perspective suggests that perceiving prejudice against one's group increases depres-sion and lowers self-esteem, whereas another perspective suggests that perceiving prejudice may, under some circumstances, protect against depression and lowered self-esteem. In our opinion, neither of these perspectives is sufficient to capture the complexity of the relationship between perceived discrimination and selfevaluative emotions. We believe that the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice against one's group are moderated by how strongly the individual identifies with the group.
Group Identification As a Moderator of Responses to Discrimination
According to Branscombe and Schmitt (Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b) , discrimination is psychologically painful because it implicates a core aspect of the self-one's social identity. Implicit in their view is the assumption that threats to social identity and threats to individual identity are experienced as one and the same and, hence, will have similar effects on self-evaluative emotions. Implicit in Crocker and Major's (1989) perspective, in contrast, is the assumption that threats to the group and threats to the individual self have different emotional implications. From their perspective, perceptions of bias against the collective self may be used to buffer the individual self from threat.
Neither of the above perspectives takes into account that individuals differ in the extent to which they incorporate a group into the personal self-concept. There is substantial evidence that individual differences in group identification are an important predictor of cognition, affect, and behavior in intergroup situations (see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002 , for a review; Mackie & Smith, 2002) . Relative to highly identified group members, individuals low in group identification are (a) less concerned with relative intergroup treatment (Petta & Walker, 1992) , (b) less likely to perceive group-based injustice (Branscombe et al., 1999; Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, & Whalen, 1989) , (c) less likely to attribute a negative outcome to discrimination when cues to prejudice are ambiguous Operario & Fiske, 2001 , Study 2), and (d) more likely to distance from the group and protect the personal self when the group is threatened (see Ellemers et al., 2002 , for a review). Thus, individual differences in group identification are likely to be an important determinant of how individuals will respond when faced with a threat to their collective self (e.g., prejudice against their group).
We define group identification as the importance, or centrality, of the group in the self-concept. This follows in the tradition of other researchers who define group identification as inclusion of the group in the self-concept (Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 2001) , as the importance of the group to the self (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) , or the importance of the group to selfdefinition (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . However, our approach is in contrast to researchers who have defined group identification as attachment to, liking for, or pride in the group (Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 1999; Smith & Tyler, 1992 ). Tajfel's (1981) definition of group identification included not only a cognitive component (similar to our definition) but also an affective component. He defined group identification as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255) . Research increasingly illustrates, however, that the cognitive (importance of the group) and affective (liking for the group) aspects of group identification are conceptually as well as empirically distinct. Furthermore, they predict different aspects of intergroup behavior (e.g., Deaux, 1996; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Tropp & Wright, 2001 ). We believe that using one term (group identification) to describe two different constructs (centrality of the group to identity, liking for the group) contributes to difficulties in interpreting and comparing empirical results of research on group identification. Accordingly, here we use the term "collective selfesteem" to refer to the affective component of one's relationship to the group (liking for the group) and the term "group identification" to refer to the cognitive component (importance of the group in the self-concept).
We propose that group identification-the extent to which the self overlaps with the group-moderates the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice against one's group. Specifically, the more central the group is to the self-concept, the more perceiving discrimination against the group should have negative consequences for self-esteem and depressed emotion. In contrast, the less central the group is to the self, the less perceiving discrimination against the group should have negative consequences for self-esteem and depressed emotion. Furthermore, drawing on Crocker and Major's perspective, among those who are not highly identified with their ingroup, perceiving discrimination against the group may protect depressed emotions and personal selfesteem from threat.
STUDY 1
Our first study addressed the implications of ingroup identification for self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem) of individuals who could or could not attribute personal rejection to prejudice against their ingroup. We predicted that being able to attribute a personal rejection to prejudice would lead to less negative self-evaluative emotions primarily among individuals low in group identification. In contrast, we predicted that for individuals highly identified with their group, learning that another is prejudiced against their collective identity is unlikely to protect their self-evaluative emotions because a threat to their collective identity is also a threat to their individual identity. Indeed, Schmitt and Branscombe's (2002b) perspective predicts that learning that others are prejudiced against one's group poses an additional threat to self.
We tested these predictions in an experiment in which women, all of whom had previously completed measures of gender identification and gender-specific collective self-esteem, received negative personal feedback from a male evaluator. Half subsequently learned that the male evaluator held sexist attitudes toward women, whereas the remainder learned that the male evaluator held nonsexist attitudes. Attributions for the negative feedback, emotion (depression and hostility), self-esteem, and postmeasures of gender identification and gender-specific collective self-esteem were then assessed. Among women rejected by a sexist evaluator, we predicted that gender identification would be negatively related to self-esteem and positively related to depressed emotion. We did not expect gender identification to moderate self-esteem and depressed emotion among women not exposed to a sexist evaluator. We also examined whether collective self-esteem (liking for women as a group) would moderate affect and selfesteem in response to prejudice in the same manner as would group identification.
Finally, although not a primary goal of this experiment, our design allowed us to test experimentally the prediction that exposure to prejudice against the ingroup increases identification with the ingroup (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) as well as the prediction that initial levels of group identification moderate changes in group identification following exposure to prejudice (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenburg, 1993; Ethier & Deaux, 1994) .
Method PARTICIPANTS AND PRETESTING SESSION
European American women (N = 54) ranging in age from 18 to 20 (M = 18.33, SD = .61) participated in the experiment for credit toward an introductory psychology course. In a pretesting session, all participants completed measures of group identification and collective self-esteem. Gender identification was assessed with the four-item Importance to Identity subscale of Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSS) (e.g., "Being a woman is an important reflection of who I am"; "In general being a woman is an important part of my self-image"; "Being a woman is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am," reverse-scored; "Overall, being a woman has very little to do with how I feel about myself," reverse-scored; α = .68). Collective self-esteem was assessed with the four-item Private Regard subscale of the CSS (e.g., "I feel good about being a woman"; "In general, I am glad to be a woman"; "I often regret that I am a woman," reverse-scored; "Overall, I often feel that being a woman is not worthwhile," reverse-scored; α = .92). Responses to the Private Regard scale (collective self-esteem) and the Importance to Identity scale (group identification) were not strongly correlated (r = .11, p > .40), reinforcing our view that these are distinct constructs.
EXPERIMENTAL SESSION
Modeled after a paradigm utilized by Crocker et al. (1991) , women participated in a study on "first impressions" and believed that they would be forming an impression of another student based on limited information. Participants were led to believe that they would either be assigned to a "performer" or "evaluator" role in a social interaction and were assured that they would never meet their interaction partner face to face. In actuality, there was only one female participant per session. The participant completed a brief attitude topics questionnaire, ostensibly to facilitate the first speech interaction. The questionnaire addressed four attitude topics: recycling, the Equal Rights Amendment, the electoral college, and future goals and plans.
Based on a bogus card selection, all participants were assigned the "performer" role, whereas the fictitious other student was assigned the "evaluator" role. The participant was given 1 min to prepare a 2-min speech that focused on the topic of Future Goals and Plans. The participant then delivered the speech over an intercom, ostensibly to the interaction partner in an adjacent cubicle. All participants then heard a negative evaluation of their speech delivered by a prerecorded male voice. The evaluator stated, Well . . . I really didn't think I would be able to tell very much about a person just from a little speech like that, but I do think I have a sense of what she's like. Umm . . . I thought the speech was . . . I guess . . . well . . . OK. She could have expressed her ideas more clearly though. Maybe then she would have sounded like a more interesting person to me. Her goals . . . they seem a little unrealistic and naive. It sounds . . . just like . . . she may not have the right qualities to get what she wants out of life. Honestly, my gut feeling is that she's just one of those sort of people who will be dependent on others and will just . . . just get by in life. That's it.
Prior to being asked to form an impression of the male evaluator, participants exchanged attitude questionnaires with the evaluator to further facilitate impression formation. For women assigned to the sexist condition, the evaluator's responses indicated he held very sexist attitudes toward women. In particular, he strongly endorsed items stating, "Women should not earn the same amount of money in certain fields because they do not have the same abilities as men"; "I think a man should be hired over a woman because men often have families to support"; "I could not work for a female boss because women can be overly emotional"; and "In my opinion, it is a good thing that the Equal Rights Amendment never passed." In the nonsexist condition, the evaluator strongly disagreed with these statements. In both conditions, the evaluator's attitudes about the electoral college, recycling, and future goals and plans were matched to the participant's attitudes. Participants subsequently completed the dependent measures and then were fully and sensitively debriefed.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Emotion. Participants completed five items assessing depressed emotion (sad, failure, confident [reversescored], pleased [reverse-scored], satisfied [reversescored]; α = .82) and three items assessing hostile emotion (angry, agitated, irritated; α = .95). The response scale for all dependent measures was 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
State self-esteem. Participants completed a brief fiveitem measure of state self-esteem adapted from the social and performance subscales of Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) scale ("I feel confident about my abilities"; "I am worried about what other people think of me"; "I feel frustrated or rattled by my performance"; "I feel that I having trouble understanding things I read"; "I feel concerned about the impression I am making"). Appropriate items were reverse-scored such that high scores indicated high state self-esteem. These items were specifically selected because they are most relevant to state self esteem in the current experimental context. This shortened measure provided a reliable assessment of state self esteem in the present study (α = .81).
Postfeedback group identification and collective self-esteem.
Participants completed the same four-item measures of group identification (α = .62) and collective self-esteem (α =.90) they had completed in pretesting.
Manipulation checks. Participants indicated the extent to which the rejection was due to an internal factor (the quality of her speech) and due to sexist discrimination (the sexism of the evaluator). In addition, each participant indicated the sex of her interaction partner, the extent to which her evaluator was sexist, and the extent to which the evaluator's attitudes toward women in the workplace differed from her own on a scale from 1 (less in favor of equal rights for women) to 5 (more in favor of equal rights for women).
Results

MANIPULATION CHECKS AND ATTRIBUTIONS
All participants correctly reported the sex of the evaluator. The perceived sexism manipulation was successful. As expected, women in the sexist condition reported that the evaluator was more sexist (M = 5.22, SD = 1.07) than did women in the nonsexist condition (M = 1.22, SD = 1.37), t(52) = 11.90, p < .001. In addition, participants in the sexist condition reported that the evaluator held more sexist attitudes toward women than their own (M = 1.04, SD = .19), whereas women in the nonsexist condition reported that the evaluator held attitudes toward women that were equivalent to their own (M = 3.06, SD = .52), t(52) = -18.76, p < .001. As well, women in the sexist condition were significantly more likely to attribute the negative evaluation to sexism (M = 4.85, SD = 1.48) than were women in the nonsexist condition (M = 1.37, SD = 1.50), t(52) = 8.57, p < .001. Finally, women in the sexist condition tended to blame the rejection on the quality of their speech less (M = 3.96, SD = 1.50) than women in the nonsexist condition (M = 4.56, SD = 1.12), t(52) = -1.64, p = .10. Four participants reported suspicion regarding the presence of another student and/or the validity of the negative feedback and were dropped from all remaining analyses. Of importance, women in both conditions had equivalent pretesting levels of group identification, t(50) = -1.24, p > .20, and collective self-esteem, t(50) = .85, p > .30.
ANALYSIS PLAN
We conducted hierarchical linear regression analyses on each dependent variable to test our hypotheses. On
Step 1, we entered the group identification main effect (continuous) and the sexist condition main effect (dummy coded: 0 = sexist, 1 = nonsexist). On Step 2, we entered the interaction of group identification and sexist condition.
We then performed these analyses again, substituting collective self-esteem (positive regard for the group) for group identification in the analyses. This enabled us to investigate whether group identification and collective self-esteem function similarly as moderators. Because our hypotheses concern the moderating effect of group identification, we present these results first.
DOES GROUP IDENTIFICATION MODERATE EMOTION AND SELF-ESTEEM IN RESPONSE TO PREJUDICE?
Depressed emotion. Women evaluated by a sexist evaluator tended to report less depressed emotion (M = 2.10, SE = .23) than women evaluated by a nonsexist evaluator (M = 2.73, SE = .23), (β = .26, p = .06). In addition, the less identified with women a participant was, the less depressed emotion she tended to report following the negative evaluation (β = .26, p = .06; Step 1: R 2 = .12, p < .05). Both of these effects were qualified by the predicted interaction between group identification and sexist condition (β = -1.54, p < .05; ∆R 2 = .08, p < .05). As predicted, group identification was positively related to depressed emotion in the sexist condition (β = .59) and unrelated to depressed emotion in the nonsexist condition (β = .03) (see top panel, Figure 1 ). Among women evaluated negatively by a sexist evaluator, the less important being a woman was to their identity, the more protected they were from experiencing depressed emotion.
State self-esteem. Neither sexist condition (β = -.20, p > .15) nor group identification (β = .02, p > .80; Step 1: R 2 = .04, p > .30) predicted state self-esteem. The predicted Group Identification × Sexist Condition interaction was significant (β = 1.52, p = .05; ∆R 2 = .07, p = .05). Among women evaluated negatively by a sexist evaluator, the less important being a woman was to their identity, the higher their self-esteem (β = -.31). In contrast, among women in the nonsexist condition, group identification and state self-esteem were positively related (β = .25) (see bottom panel, Figure 1 ).
Hostile emotion. Overall, women reported feeling levels of hostility at around the midpoint of the scale following the negative evaluation (M = 3.07, SD = 2.03). No effect of sexist condition, group identification, or the interaction was found (ps > .50). Consistent with prior research (Crocker et al., 1991; , women evaluated negatively by a sexist man were just as angry as women evaluated negatively by a nonsexist man.
DOES PREJUDICE INCREASE OR DECREASE GROUP IDENTIFICATION?
Postrejection group identification. Not surprisingly, group identification assessed at prescreening was a significant predictor of postrejection group identification (β = .47, p < .001). Although not significant, women evaluated by a man with sexist attitudes tended to be more identified with their gender group (M = 4.35, SE = .16) than women evaluated by a nonsexist evaluator (M = 3.97, SE = .17; β = -.19, p = .12; Step 1: R 2 = .28, p < .001). The interaction was not significant (β = .70, p > .30; Step 2: ∆R 2 = .02, p > .30).
DOES PREJUDICE AFFECT COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM?
Postrejection collective self-esteem. To assess changes in collective self-esteem, we first controlled for pretesting levels of collective self-esteem by entering this variable on Step 1 of the analysis. On Step 2, we entered the main effects of group identification and sexist condition. On
Step 3, we entered the interaction. As expected, collective self-esteem prior to participation significantly predicted collective self-esteem postrejection (β = .78, p < .05; Step 1: R 2 = .58, p < .001). No effects were found for sexist condition, group identification, or the interaction (ps > .30).
DOES COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM MODERATE RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE?
We performed all of the above analyses again using collective self-esteem rather than group identification as the individual difference variable in the analyses. No significant main effects of collective self-esteem, or moderation of the effect of the sexism of the evaluator on affect (depressed affect, ps > .50; hostile affect, ps > .40) or state self-esteem (ps > .30) were observed. Not surprisingly, initial levels of collective self-esteem significantly predicted postrejection collective self-esteem (β = .77, p < .001). However, collective self-esteem did not predict 
Discussion
Study 1 attempted to reconcile two seemingly disparate perspectives on the emotional consequences of perceiving discrimination against one's group. Crocker and Major (1989) hypothesized that being able to blame negative personal outcomes on prejudice against one's group can protect personal self-esteem to the extent that it allows one to discount the role of internal, stable aspects of self in producing those outcomes. Schmitt and Branscombe (2002b) hypothesized that being able to blame negative outcomes on prejudice against one's group will be harmful to personal self-esteem because prejudice is a threat to a core aspect of self-one's social identity. We found some support for both perspectives. Women who were low in gender identification showed responses consistent with predictions of Crocker and Major (1989) . Among women rejected by a man they perceived as sexist, the less they identified with being a woman, the less depressed mood, and the higher selfesteem they reported feeling. Furthermore, the pattern of the interaction shown in Figure 1 suggests that among low-gender-identified women, those who could attribute negative feedback to sexism experienced less negative self-evaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem) than those who could not make this attribution. Thus, Crocker and Major's self-protective attributional strategy may be primarily effective for members of stigmatized groups for whom the group is not a core aspect of self.
High-gender-identified women, in contrast, showed responses more consistent with predictions of Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a) . For women high in group identification, knowing that the negative evaluator was sexist did not buffer self-esteem or depressed emotion. Among women high in group identification, those who could attribute their rejection to sexism felt just as bad as those who could not make this attribution (see Figure 1) . These results suggest that for highly identified group members, an attack on the group is experienced as a threat to the self. Thus, a threat to the collective self (sexism) cannot be used to protect the personal self. Consequently, the hypothesis that attributions to discrimination are detrimental may be primarily true when the group membership is a core aspect of self.
Although results of this first study are provocative, there are several limitations. First, it could be argued that the effects observed here are limited to situations in which a person is exposed to a single prejudiced person (a sexist evaluator) and may not apply when people perceive that discrimination against their group is global and pervasive. There is substantial evidence that perceiving oneself or one's group as a victim of pervasive discrimination is negatively associated with self-esteem and well-being (see Major et al., 2002 , for a review). It is possible that regardless of individual differences in group identification, all members of a group will experience more negative self-evaluative emotions and lower selfesteem when their social identity is perceived as under pervasive threat. In short, group identification may have different emotional implications in the presence of pervasive prejudice against one's group than it has when one experiences an isolated instance of prejudice from a single person.
Second, it could be argued that the effects observed here are limited to situations in which an individual has experienced a personal threat that they are trying to defend against. That is, without the presence of personal threat (e.g., personal rejection), identification with the group may be irrelevant as a moderator of emotional responses to perceived group discrimination. In the absence of personal threat, perceptions of discrimination against the ingroup may lead to negative selfevaluative emotions among all ingroup members.
Third, the majority of experimental research investigating the emotional implications of attributions to prejudice has examined emotions and self-esteem of women in response to sexism. Gender identification is likely to differ from ethnic group identification in important ways, such as the extent to which the group identity is accompanied by ideologies about discrimination and oppression. Accordingly, it is important to examine whether group identification moderates emotional responses to perceived discrimination among groups other than women.
Finally, it is important to examine the process by which group identification affects emotional responses to perceived discrimination. We speculated that for individuals who are highly identified with their ingroup, a threat against the group is experienced as a threat against the self. Consequently, we expected highly group identified individuals to report more feelings of personal threat in response to perceiving discrimination against the ingroup than low group identified individuals. Furthermore, we expected perceptions of personal threat to mediate the effect of group identification on self-evaluative emotions. We conducted a second study to address the above limitations and issues. STUDY 2 In Study 2, Latino-American participants, all of whom had previously completed a measure of group identification, were randomly assigned to read an article describing the existence of severe and pervasive prejudice against Latinos/Latinas in the United States or against an unfamiliar outgroup (the Inuit) in Canada. Selfevaluative emotions (depression and self-esteem), hostile emotions, appraisals of personal threat, group identification, and collective self-esteem were then assessed. We hypothesized that perceiving prejudice against the ingroup would be more painful for highly identified group members than for those low in group identification. Thus, we expected ethnic identification to be positively related to depressed emotions and negatively related to self-esteem among Latino-Americans in the ingroup prejudice condition. We did not expect to observe these relationships in the outgroup prejudice condition.
Method PARTICIPANTS
Latino-American participants (N = 36, men = 12, women = 24) ranging in age from 18 to 24 (M = 18.53, SD = 1.21) participated in the experiment for credit toward an introductory psychology course. In a prescreening session, all participants completed the same four-item measure of collective self-esteem (α =. 84) used in Study 1 and a six-item measure of group identification, both phrased specific to ethnicity. The measure of group identification included the four items used in Study 1 in addition to two new items reflecting overlap of the self and the group ("My ethnic group's successes are my successes"; "When someone criticizes my group it feels like a personal insult"; Silver, 2002) . The addition of these items increased scale reliability (α = .71). As in Study 1, group identification and collective self-esteem were not strongly correlated (r = .25, p > .14), reinforcing that these are distinct constructs.
EXPERIMENTAL SESSION
Participants were run in groups of 5 to 10 and believed the purpose of the experiment was to investigate college students' reactions to newspaper articles. The experiment was conducted in conjunction with a related survey study. Thus, there were at least five European American students present at every session. In this intergroup setting, participants were randomly assigned to read either an article that reported that prejudice and discrimination against Latino-American students in California was severe and pervasive or an identical article reporting that prejudice and discrimination against the Inuit in Canada was severe and pervasive. Participants then completed the dependent measures listed below and were fully debriefed. State self-esteem. The participants completed the same five-item measure of state self-esteem used in Study 1 (α = .84).
Hostile emotion. Hostile emotion was assessed with a five-item measure (angry, agitated, irritated, hostile, mad; α = .91).
Group identification and collective self-esteem. The participants completed the same measures of group identification (α = .74) and collective self-esteem (α = .76), phrased specific to ethnicity, used in Study 1.
2
Appraisals of personal threat. We assessed the extent to which participants felt personally threatened by racism with a nine-item scale (e.g., "Racism will affect many areas of my life,", "Racism is personally threatening to me"; α = .80).
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked how credible the news article was on a 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much) scale. In addition, participants completed four items assessing the extent to which Latinos as a group face pervasive racism (e.g., "Members of my group face a good deal of racism"; "My racial group will likely be a target of racism in the next year"; α = .76).
Results
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Three participants reported suspicion regarding the validity of the article (two participants in the outgroup [Inuit] prejudice condition, one in the ingroup [Latino] prejudice condition) and were dropped from the analyses. Remaining participants rated the articles as equivalently credible (Inuit: M = 4.47, SD = 1.12; Latino: M = 4.16, SD = .90), t(31) = .93, p > .36. Participants who read about prejudice against Latinos were significantly more likely to report that Latinos as a group faced pervasive racism (M = 4.01, SD = .97) than participants who read about prejudice against the Inuit (M = 3.23, SD = 1.20), t(31) = -2.15, p < .05. Of importance, pretesting levels of group identification did not moderate this effect (p > .60). Thus, our manipulation of perceptions of pervasive prejudice was successful. There were no significant differences by condition in pretesting levels of either group identification, t(31) = -.21, p > .80, or collective selfesteem, t(31) = .77, p > .40.
ANALYSIS PLAN
As in Study 1, we conducted hierarchical linear regression analyses on each dependent variable. On
Step 1, we entered the group identification main effect (continuous) and the prejudice condition main effect (dummy coded: 0 = ingroup prejudice [Latino] , 1 = outgroup prejudice [Inuit] ). On Step 2, we entered the interaction of group identification and prejudice condition.
DOES GROUP IDENTIFICATION MODERATE EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE?
Depressed emotion. Group identification was unrelated to depressed emotions (β = .12, p > .40). Participants who read about prejudice against the ingroup reported significantly more depressed affect (M = 2.65, SE = .23) than those who read about prejudice against an outgroup (M = 1.91, SE = .25; β = .35, p < .05; Step 1: R 2 = .15, p = .08). However, the effect of prejudice condition was qualified by the predicted Group Identification × Prejudice Condition interaction (β = .43, p < .05; Step 2: ∆R 2 = .10, p = .05). The simple slopes for this interaction are shown in the top panel of Figure 2 . Consistent with predictions, group identification was positively associated with depressed emotion when participants read about prejudice against the ingroup (β = .40) but was negatively associated with depressed emotion when participants read about prejudice toward an outgroup (β = -.25).
State self-esteem. No significant effects were found for the analysis predicting state self-esteem (ps > .16). However, in line with predictions, group identification tended to be negatively associated with state self-esteem in the ingroup prejudice condition (β = -.13) and positively associated with state self-esteem in the outgroup prejudice condition (β = .32).
Hostile emotion. Participants were significantly angrier in the ingroup prejudice condition (M = 2.34, SE = .31) than in the outgroup prejudice condition (M = .95, SE = .33; β = .46, p < .01). Neither the main effect of group identification (β = .22, p = .15; Step 1: R 2 = .28, p < .01) nor the interaction (β = .21, p > .25; Step 2: ∆R 2 = .02, p > .25) was significant.
Appraisals of personal threat. We next examined whether group identification and prejudice condition moderated the extent to which Latinos appraised racism as personally threatening. No significant main effects of prejudice condition (β = .22, p > .20) or group identification were found (β = .10, p > .50; Step 1: R 2 = .06, p > .30). The predicted interaction, however, was significant (β = .43, p = .05; Step 2: ∆R 2 = .11, p = .05). As expected, group identification was positively associated with threat appraisals in the ingroup prejudice condition (β = .41) and negatively associated with threat appraisals in the outgroup prejudice condition (β = -.23) (see bottom panel, Figure 2 ).
DO THREAT APPRAISALS MEDIATE DEPRESSED EMOTION EFFECTS?
We tested whether threat appraisals mediated the effect of the interaction on depressed emotion using procedures specified by Baron and Kenney (1986) . As reported previously, the interaction of group identification and prejudice condition significantly predicted both depressed emotion (β = .43, p < .05) and appraisals of threat (β = .43, p = .05). In the final step of the mediational analysis, we included threat appraisals and the interaction in the model predicting depressed emotion. As hypothesized, threat appraisals mediated the relationship between the interaction and depressed emotion. Threat appraisals were significantly and positively related to depressed affect (β = .50, p < .05). In addition, in the presence of threat appraisals, the interaction no longer significantly predicted depressed affect (β = .19, p > .30).
DOES PREJUDICE INCREASE OR DECREASE GROUP IDENTIFICATION?
Not surprisingly, group identification assessed at pretesting significantly predicted group identification assessed in the experiment (β = .52, p < . effect of prejudice condition on group identification was found (β = -.18, p > .20;
Step 1: R 2 = .29, p < .01). However, the Group Identification × Prejudice interaction was significant (β = .50, p < .01; Step 2: ∆R 2 = .15, p < .01). The simple slopes for this interaction are shown in Figure 3 . When Latino-American participants read about prejudice against their ingroup, those low in identification identified even less with Latinos, whereas those high in group identification identified even more strongly with Latinos, relative to their pretest levels of ethnic group identification (β = .70, p < .001).
3 The change in group identification in the control condition was much less strong (β = .30, p > .20) .
DOES COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM CHANGE IN RESPONSE TO PREJUDICE?
As expected, both collective self-esteem (β = .35, p < .05) and group identification (β = .36, p < .05) assessed at pretesting significantly predicted collective self-esteem in the experiment. However, neither the effect of prejudice condition (β = .03, p > .80) nor the interaction was significant (β = .26, p > .20) .
DOES COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM MODERATE RESPONSES TO PREJUDICE?
As in Study 1, we performed all of the above analyses again, using collective self-esteem rather than group identification as the moderator in the analyses. There was a marginally significant interaction predicting state self-esteem (β = -.61, p = .08; R 2 = .15, ∆R 2 = .09, p = .08). Collective self-esteem was positively associated with state self-esteem in the outgroup prejudice condition (β = .64) and unassociated with state self-esteem in the ingroup prejudice condition (β = -.06). In the remaining analyses, only the main effect of initial levels of collective self-esteem predicting experimental collective self-esteem was significant (β = .36, p < .05; all other ps > .13). Thus, as in Study 1, collective self-esteem did not moderate emotional responses to prejudice.
Discussion
Consistent with predictions, the results of Study 2 illustrate that group identification moderates selfevaluative emotional responses to perceptions of pervasive prejudice against one's ethnic group. Latino-Americans who read about pervasive prejudice against Latinos reported significantly more depressed emotion the more strongly they identified with the group. LatinoAmericans who read about prejudice against an outgroup, in contrast, tended to report less depressed emotion the more strongly they identified with their group. Consequently, exposure to pervasive prejudice against the ingroup led to more negative self-evaluative emotions than exposure to prejudice against an outgroup for participants who identified highly with their group, but not for those who were low in ethnic group identification. Thus, the effects observed in Study 1 are not unique to women, to situations involving a specific personal threat, or to situations involving a single prejudiced person.
In addition, Study 2 provides initial evidence for the process by which group identification influences depressed emotion in the face of prejudice. As we predicted, when Latinos were faced with pervasive prejudice against the ingroup, they were more personally threatened by racism the more they identified with the group. Intriguingly, there was no main effect of prejudice condition on appraisals of threat. It was not the case that Latino-Americans appraised racism as more personally threatening in the ingroup prejudice condition than in the outgroup prejudice condition. Nor was it the case that individuals high in group identification appraised racism as more personally threatening than those low in group identification. It was only when pervasive prejudice against the ingroup was salient that group identification and appraisals of threat were positively related. This suggests that for those high in group identification, a threat against the group is appraised as a threat to the self. Our mediational analysis illustrated that it is this heightened appraisal of personal threat that is responsible for the observed effect of group identification on depressed emotion.
Consistent with Study 1, our findings were specific to depressed emotions and did not apply to hostile emotions. In addition, depressed emotions proved to be a more sensitive measure of state psychological well-being than was state self-esteem. Expanded and more precise measures of emotions (e.g., shame, pride, guilt) are likely to yield a fuller understanding of the emotional consequences of being a target of prejudice than measures of self-esteem. Furthermore, because personal selfesteem is not equivalently valued in all cultures, empirical results regarding the emotional consequences of perceived prejudice may be more easily compared cross-culturally than self-esteem results.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research helps to reconcile differing theoretical predictions concerning the consequences of perceived prejudice for self-evaluative emotions (depression and personal self-esteem). One perspective suggests that perceiving prejudice against one's group is negatively associated with self-evaluative emotions (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999) . Another perspective suggests that perceiving prejudice against one's group may, under some circumstances, protect personal self-esteem (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989) . In the present research, we found support for both perspectives. Overall, our research illustrates that whether perceiving prejudice is negatively associated with self-evaluative emotions or not depends in part on the extent to which an individual identifies with the group. Perceiving prejudice against one's group is psychologically painful for individuals who are highly identified with their group. In Study 1, women exposed to a negative outcome due to sexism reported more negative self-evaluative emotions the more important the group was to their identity. LatinoAmericans in Study 2, who read about pervasive racism against Latinos, reported more depressed emotions and were more personally threatened by racism the more strongly they identified with the group. Of importance, however, we also showed that perceiving sexism protected the self-evaluative emotions of low-group-identified women who experienced a personal rejection.
Only group identification (defined as importance to the self-concept) and not collective self-esteem (defined as liking for the group) moderated women's depressed emotion and self-esteem following the sexist rejection and Latino-Americans' depressed emotion following reading about pervasive prejudice. Our results join those of other researchers in stressing the importance of distinguishing between these important but distinct aspects of one's relationship to the group (Deaux, 1996; Ellemers et al., 1999; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Tropp & Wright, 2001 ). However, our definition of group identification as "importance of the group to the self-concept" may prove too limiting to those who suggest that group identification may contain different components depending on the group in question (e.g., Sellars, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997) and those who suggest that one construct (inclusion of the ingroup in the self) may underlie both our conceptualization of group identification and our conceptualization of collective self-esteem (e.g., Tropp & Wright, 2001 ). Nevertheless, we believe that distinguishing these aspects of one's relationship to the group into the separate constructs of group identification and collective self-esteem will facilitate interstudy comparison as well as clarify the relationships among group identification, collective self-esteem, self-evaluative emotions, and the experience of discrimination.
It could be argued that one limitation of the present research is that we measured rather than manipulated our moderating variable (group identification). Although several studies indicate that the salience of group identities can be manipulated in the laboratory (e.g., Smith & Henry, 1996) , evidence that identification with important social categories can be likewise manipulated is scarce. We concur with Ellemers and colleagues' (Ellemers et al., 2002) observation that it is difficult to experimentally manipulate the importance of a naturally occurring group identity to the self-concept during the time-span of a typical experiment.
Nonetheless, the fact that our moderating variable was measured rather than manipulated leaves open an alternative explanation for our data. There is substantial evidence that group identification is positively correlated with perceptions of personal and group discrimination (see Major et al., 2002 , for a review). This relationship suggests the possibility that the important moderating variable underlying the present findings is perceptions of being a frequent target of discrimination rather than group identification. Pretest data on participants in the current studies indicated that perceptions of discrimination (e.g., "I experience discrimination because of my gender/race"; My gender/racial group is discriminated against"; four items, α = .82) were significantly and positively correlated with group identification both in Study 1, r = .44, p < .05, and Study 2, r = .43, p < .05. However, when we controlled for individual differences in perceptions of discrimination (and/or the interaction of perceptions of discrimination and prejudice condition) in regression analyses predicting selfevaluative emotions, results of the current research were unchanged. In fact, the effects of group identification on self-evaluative emotions became stronger in Study 1 and were unchanged in Study 2. Thus, the effects demonstrated in the present research cannot be explained by the "third variable problem" of perceiving oneself as a target of discrimination.
One conclusion that might be drawn from our data is that identifying with a group makes one emotionally vulnerable if that group is a target of prejudice. Although this is an accurate characterization of our data, we do not believe that this would be a correct inference to draw. The relationship between group identification and psy-chological well-being among minority groups is complex. We think it is likely that high group identification produces an initial, temporary increase in emotional vulnerability in response to group threat but that identifying with the group also provides a source of emotional and tangible support and, hence, emotional resilience as time goes on. A number of studies have shown a positive relationship between group identification and various aspects of psychological well-being among members of stigmatized groups (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Crosby et al., 1989) . Such findings suggest that group identification is an important source of resilience among members of stigmatized groups. Group identification is positively associated with feeling a sense of comfort when interacting with ingroup members (Tropp & Wright, 2001 ) and with feeling close to fellow ingroup members (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) , consistent with the idea that ingroup members are a source of social and emotional support for highly identified individuals.
If identification with the ingroup is a source of selfprotection in response to threats to the group, we might expect that ingroup identification would increase as a function of exposure to prejudice against the ingroup (Allport, 1954 (Allport, /1979 . We found mixed support for this hypothesis. In Study 1, women who were rejected by a sexist man tended to report higher group identification than women who were rejected by a nonsexist man, although this difference was not significant. In Study 2, Latinos who were initially high in ethnic identification identified even more strongly with being Latino if they read about pervasive prejudice against their ingroup as compared to an outgroup. In contrast, Latinos who were initially low in ethnic identification disidentified even more strongly if they read about pervasive prejudice against their group. These patterns are consistent with those observed by Ellemers (Ellemers et al., 1993) and Ethier and Deaux (1994) . These results suggest that even though highly identified group members are more vulnerable to group threats, they also identify more strongly with the group after threat. Further research is needed on the psychological implications of ingroup identification among members of devalued groups.
In closing, we note that unless individuals identify with their group, it is unlikely that social change targeted at reducing discrimination will occur. Members of stigmatized groups who are highly identified with their group are most likely to perceive group-based injustice (Crosby et al., 1989; Major et al., in press; Operario & Fiske, 2001 ) and pursue collective action (see Wright & Tropp, 2002 , for a review). Hence, members of stigmatized groups who are low in group identification may be exchanging a short-term personal benefit for a longterm group cost. NOTES 1. Details of the analyses using collective self-esteem as an alternative moderator of the effect of the sexism of the evaluator (Study 1) or prejudice condition (Study 2) on the dependent variables are available from the first author.
2. The two new group identification items were inadvertently omitted from the dependent measures.
3. These conclusions are further supported by a 2 (group identification median split: high, low) × 2 (condition: ingroup or outgroup prejudice) ANOVA conducted on group identification assessed in the experiment. The interaction was significant, F(1, 35) = 11.35, p < .01. Latino participants low in group identification reported significantly lower group identification in the ingroup prejudice condition (M = 2.31) than in the outgroup prejudice condition (M = 3.71, p < .05). In contrast, participants high in group identification tended to report significantly higher group identification in the ingroup prejudice condition (M = 4.65) than in the outgroup prejudice condition (M = 4.0, p = .10).
